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A 23. (New) The method of claim 22 including communicating information about a first spoken command to the container, checking an active vocabulary list in the container to determine if the first spoken command is one used in an active task, and if the first spoken command is one used in an active task, transferring the identifier for the spoken command to the object. A

On Mnemonic
On Nemonic
C A 24. (New) The method of claim 21 including using an On Nemonic method to communicate between the container and the object. A

REMARKS

Claims 8-13

Claim 8 has been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Andreshak.

Claim 8 calls for associating speech commands with identifiers and associating the identifiers with action to be taken in response to each command. The identifier for a spoken command is identified and provided to a software object. In this way, identifiers may be utilized which may also be supplied by non-spoken commands. For example, a keyboard input or mouse input may provide the same identifier and may result in the same action by the software object. Thus, the use of identifiers in this fashion makes the software object amenable to inputs from a variety of sources.

The office action now suggests that Andreshak (column 3, lines 61-65 and column 7, lines 37-48) somehow teaches the missing identifiers. The Examiner is apparently referring to the portion of the disclosure which talks about so called "global commands". These commands (illustrated in Figure 5) are nothing more than a vocabulary of commands which may be utilized

in any specific mode of the device. Each of a plurality of modes may have their own vocabulary and in addition each of those modes may be responsive to global commands. Thus, the global commands may be utilized regardless of what mode the system is in.

The Andreshak reference, in the relied upon portion, has absolutely nothing to do with the claimed invention and makes no teaching of associating speech commands with identifiers. The identifier language in the office action (in the first paragraph under numbered paragraph number two on page two) is non-existent in the reference. The material quoted in the reference never calls anything an "identifier" as suggested in the office action.

Instead the exact language from the cited reference is as follows:

The vocabulary of acoustic command modules for each active state may further comprise the set of global acoustic command models representing global commands identifying functions which can be performed in each active state of the target computer program.

Column 3, lines 61-65. There is no suggestion of using an "identifier" that is associated with a speech command.

Moreover, there is no suggestion of associating an "identifier" of actions to be taken or determining the identifier for a command and providing this identifier to a software object.

Similarly, the cited language from column 7, lines 37-48 is no more availing:

Returning again to Figure 1, the interactive computer system comprises a system acoustic command model vocabulary store 28 for storing a system vocabulary with acoustic command models. Each acoustic command module represents one or more of a series of acoustic feature values representing an

utterance of one or more words associated with the acoustic command model.

All this language appears to suggest is that a variety of commands may be contained in a vocabulary and these commands may be recognized as acoustic feature values. Again, there is no suggestion whatsoever of using identifiers.

The cited language continues in the next paragraph:

The stored acoustic command modules may be, for example, Markov models or other dynamic programming models. The parameters of the acoustic command models may be estimated from a known uttered training text (for example, 257 sentences) by, for example, smoothing parameters obtained by the forward-backward algorithm.

Again, the cited language has nothing to do with the claimed invention.

The prior art focuses on identifying the spoken language but did not think of providing identifiers associated with spoken commands. Once the spoken commands are associated with identifiers, the same identifiers, received from other non-spoken input devices, may be handled in the same way. There is absolutely no teaching of this in the cited Andreshak reference.

The Markov models are not identifiers; instead the Markov models are acoustic models for recognizing speech. They have nothing to do with associating speech with an identifier and no such claim is ever made in the Andreshak reference. Any speech recognition system may use Markov models but that does not mean they use identifiers associated with spoken commands.

As another example, the office action's analysis of the fourth clause of claim 8 is similarly unavailing. This clause calls for providing the identifier to a software object. In this case, the office action relies on column 4, lines 38-48 and column 3, lines 42-47. Column 3, lines 42-47 states as follows:

The target computer program may, for example, have only one active state during each time period. The target computer program may comprise an operating system program alone, an application program and an operating system program combined, or two or more application programs and an operating system program.

This language has nothing to do whatsoever with providing an identifier to a software object. Nor does it not in any way suggest such an approach.

Similarly, the reliance on column 4, lines 38-48 is equally unavailing. That language is as follows:

By identifying at least one object displayed in the active-state image of the target computer program, and by generating from the identified object a list of one or more active-state commands identifying functions which can be performed in the active state of the computer program, the active-state vocabulary of the speech recognizer can be limited to a small subset of the system vocabulary representing active-state commands, without having to predict in advance the states and transitions between states of the target computer program which occur under all possible circumstances.

Again, all this means is that one active state image is identified as illustrated in Figure 2 for example. The object then could be the item 20 for example. From that object, a list of one or more active state commands identifying functions which can be performed is provided. Thus, for the list box object 20, a vertical scroll bar object 24, and blue, green, orange, red, black, white and purple objects may be identified as indicated in column 5, lines 45-58. For example, referring to Table I in column 6, the vertical scroll bar object may be associated with commands such as scroll bar and up. Again, an identifier is never provided to a software object and Andreshak never suggests

any such thing. Similarly, the other claimed elements are likewise undisclosed, unsuggested and not in any way contemplated by Andreshak.

For the same reason, claim 12 distinguishes over the Andreshak reference.

Claims 14 and 15

With respect to claim 14, there is no teaching of a software object that receives both spoken and non-spoken command information.

The Examiner argues:

Andreshak teaches computer response to inputs by an object receiving [sic, spoken] or non-spoken commands as shown on Fig. 1 where image object identifier 26 (col. 5, lines 35-43) intercepts signals (col. 5, lines 58-61) from displayed active-state objects (col. 5, lines 35-43) activated by an interactive user of a target program 10 (col. 5, lines 29-38), and identifies identifiers of command objects of a target program which are currently open in its current active state and are sent to 'active state command model vocabulary identifier' 30.

Of course this identifier 30 merely tells what vocabulary is active. There is absolutely no teaching whatsoever of providing a software object that responds to both spoken and non-spoken commands. Moreover, the entire discussion on the bottom of page 4 and the top of page 5 of the office action never once addresses the critical claim limitation of a software object that receives spoken and non-spoken commands.

Parsing the cited passages which have nothing to do with the claim limitations, column 6, lines 5-13 reads as follows:

The image object identifier 26 may comprise computer program subroutines designed to intersect (hook) operating system function calls, an application program call is provided one or more target computer programs

and/or may comprise computer program subroutines for using operating system interrupts, function calls or application program interface calls for identifying objects displayed in the first active-state image of the target computer program.

While the word "object" is mentioned once in this quote, that object again refers to things like the list box object displayed on the display screen. It does not refer to a software object that responds to both spoken and non-spoken commands.

Again, referring to each line of the cited paragraph, there is nothing in the Examiner's argument that in any way suggests that a software object is provided that receives both spoken and non-spoken commands.

For the same reason, claim 15 is not suggested in any way by the cited reference.

There is no specific language in Andreshak which teaches responding to both spoken and non-spoken commands with the same software object. This feature is explicitly claimed in claim 14. Moreover, the failure of the reference to teach this element suggests that the reference has no reason to associate spoken commands with identifiers and provide the identifier to a software object as set forth in claim 8. Having no reason to do what is claimed, it is not seen why the reference could be viewed as teaching what is claimed.

Claims 21-24:

The newly added claims call for a method in which the source identifier is used for both spoken and unspoken commands. No such method is suggested by the cited art.

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
In view of these remarks, the application is now in condition for allowance and the Examiner's prompt action in

accordance therewith is respectfully requested. The Assistant Commissioner is authorized to charge any additional fees or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 20-1504.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: _____

4/3/00



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